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From Campbell to Hayne: W[h]ither Australia?  
Australian Financial Regulation and Supervision at a Cross-Roads 
Abstract 
The Australian Government is in receipt of landmark advice: Heydon Royal Commission,1 
Productivity Commission,2 and the Hayne Royal Commission.3 Each of them points to deep 
systemic and cyclical problems in the provision of financial products and financial services. 
Whilst the Hayne Royal Commission identified egregious behaviour in banks and large 
financial institutions, far greater economic damage has occurred in less well known sectors of 
the Australian financial system. Australian law regulating and supervising Non-Bank 
Financial Entities (NBFEs) has failed those it purports to protect: the vulnerable investing 
public. Systemic failure manifests in extraordinary loss of investor funds and nationwide 
economic damage. Without substantial law reform, this author predicts systemic deficiencies 
in regulation will remain, repeating their cyclical manifestations.  
Australia’s plight is not unique but no other nation with a sophisticated economy now suffers 
comparatively. Blame is being attached to the basic policy framework whereas in fact it is 
policy implementation and enforcement that has allowed systemic failures to manifest.  
Research demonstrates that inherent tensions between entrepreneurship and investor risk, 
optimal investor outcomes balanced with compliance, are not of themselves contradictory in a 
market based system, but they rely upon defining objectives, eliminating conflicts of 
objectives and conflicts of interest, significantly enhanced behavioural standards of market 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption (Interim Report, 
December 2014); Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption 
(Final Report, December 2015) (Commissioner Heydon). 
2 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System (Draft 
Report, January 2018); Australian Government Productivity Commission, Superannuation: Assessing 
Efficiency and Competitiveness (Report No 91, 2018). 
3 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 




participants, and the de-politicisation of the regulatory environment. This analysis 
demonstrates that fiduciary principles are misunderstood, applied haphazardly, often ignored, 
and subservient to specific statutory and contractual provisions.  
Australia has a history of subsuming fiduciary principles behind statutory and contractual 
frameworks facilitating grudging disclosure and creeping corruption. Community expectations 
of what each market participant should do is often different from what they actually do.  
Hayne’s real message is the need to link law and morality, community norms and expectations 





This is the story of modern Australia: why parts of the Australian economy struggle in a twenty first 
century globalised world. Australian industry is heavily dependent on non-bank financing: Non-
Bank Financial Entities4 have filled these financing gaps. 
[T]heir growth leads to a virtuous cycle through which countries benefit from broader access to 
financial services and a more competitive, diversified financial sector … offer[ing] individuals 
and small- and medium-scale enterprises a broader menu of financial services … creating jobs 
… promot[ing] competition by introducing new industries that challenge the services and 
capacities of banks …5 
NBFEs include those entities providing financial advice and wealth management, bank controlled 
wealth management entities, non-bank financial products providers, collective investment schemes, 
investment managers, trustees, custodians, research houses, asset allocation consultants, securities 
brokers, securities platforms, hedge funds, insurance entities, finance companies, workers 
entitlement funds, and superannuation entities (public, industry, corporate, and Self-Managed Super 
Fund (SMSF)). Their main distinction is not being Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs), 
and apart from some superannuation entities, not being prudentially regulated. These attributes set 
NBFEs apart from mainstream commercial banking, although many banks participate in NBFE 
markets through related party structures becoming vertically integrated financial conglomerates. 
Non-banks have also become financial conglomerates but have not been subject to prudential 
regulation. Some have been private or publicly listed vertically integrated multi-function financial 
entities; some are multinational financial services and funds management conglomerates; some 
                                                 
4 NBFEs, sometimes referred to as Non-Bank Financial Institutions or NBFIs (a narrower term), colloquially 
known as shadow banking, terminology commonly used in other jurisdictions. 
5 Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, ‘The development and regulation of Non-Bank Financial 




have been taken into public ownership given their local systemic importance. ‘[N]o unique 
classification of institutions provided is appropriate to all situations’.6 Shadow banks may include 
some commercial activity within banks, being a ‘broad definition that captures many forms of 
financial intermediation that are important for economic growth’.7  
NBFEs are sometimes categorised as ‘investment banks’. This, and ‘investment banking’, 
are ill-defined terms. As Tuch notes, they can include, in the same entity: securities advice to 
wholesale and retail clients, underwriting, corporate advice, securities trading, investment research, 
securities dealing, corporate finance, asset management, private equity, hedge funds and foreign 
exchange trading.8 
The influence of investment banks in the financial system and broader community is vast and 
their importance is increasing. The transactions on which they advise can have significant 
consequences for business competition and employment, often on an industry-wide or national 
basis.9 
Some become financial conglomerates. ‘Financial conglomerates span industry domestic 
boundaries and international boundaries’.10 They also span regulatory jurisdictional boundaries. 
‘Modern financial intermediation processes add newer elements that do not always fit into the 
traditional silo based ways of … market based-regulations … or market-specific supervision. 
Reform approaches need to be more holistic’.11  
                                                 
6 Ibid 5. 
7 Stijn Claessens and Laura Kodres, ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some 
uncomfortable questions’ (Working Paper No 14/46, International Monetary Fund, March 2014) 19. 
8 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) Melbourne 
University Law Review 478, 486. 
9 Ibid 484. 
10 Jeffrey Carmichael, ‘Regulatory lessons from the Crisis: A view from Down Under’ (Presentation to 
OECD/ADBI Roundtable, February 2010); see also, Mohamed Ariff, John H Farrar and Ahmed M 
Khalid (eds), Regulatory Failure and the GFC – An Australian Perspective (Elgar Online, 2012) ch 12. 
11 Claessens and Kodres (n 7) 4. 
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With limited exceptions, none of the entities categorised as conglomerates in this author’s 
empirical analysis are ADIs. The exceptions are multi-function holding entities which have 
acquired or control an ADI (eg a building society, general insurer). ADI functions of banking 
conglomerates which control financial planning and wealth management entities are excluded from 
the analysis. 
NBFEs, however categorised are socially important and underpin the operation of the 
modern economy in Australia and elsewhere. They are systemically important and ‘may contribute 
to the build-up of systemic risk and severity of financial crises’.12 These risks have included runs on 
funds and contagion. Other authors agree: ‘Systemic risks emerged, yet went undetected or not 
addressed for some time and then created great havoc’.13 This author’s empirical analysis illustrates 
the point. Tuch notes the ‘social repercussions and its public dimensions’.14  
Many NBFEs have been and are of the size and systemic importance that the regulatory 
distinctions between ADIs and non-ADIs, and between ex ante supervision and ex post market 
conduct, may be obsolete and should be reviewed. The Australian superannuation asset base is 
larger than that of its banking system and heavily exposed to other NBFEs. 
1.1 The Law Matters 
The law matters. ‘The law can facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, regulate and 
control’.15 This maxim is being lost in present day Australian NBFE regulation and needs to be 
                                                 
12 Elias Bengtsson, ‘Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2014) 23(2) Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 101. 
13 Claessens and Kodres (n 7) 4. 
14 Tuch (n 8) 505 citing Charles R Geisst, Investment Banking the Financial System (Prentice Hall Business 
Publishing, 1995) 1. 
15 Justice Michael Kirby, 'The company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the 




recovered since it can also have the opposite result. There is ‘a positive relationship between 
financial sector functions and economic growth’.16 ‘Law Matters’ means a jurisprudence regime 
which allows investors to feel confident of expected economic outcomes, uncorrupted by the 
political milieu. Is this the case in Australia today where significant numbers and groups of 
investors lack confidence in financial entities and their regulators? ‘[T]he state should create the 
framework ― the rules of the game for the economy’.17 
The general legal framework is arguably the single most important determinant of a sound 
NBFI[E] sector. Legislation underpinning the specific framework for NBFIs [E’s] is the 
foundation of good regulation … There should be no ambiguity.18  
[C]ountries that lack a coherent policy framework and effective regulations, nonbank financial 
institutions [NBFEs] such as insurance, leasing and finance companies, and collective 
investment vehicles, can exacerbate the fragility of the financial system. This fragility is often 
the result of a conscious effort to arbitrage and circumvent banking regulations.19 
The Law Matters thesis ‘constitutes the crucial bedrock’ that underpins economies.20 This author’s 
empirical analysis proves that law matters in NBFE regulation, supervision and governance 
including the selective application and enforcement of present law.21  
Policymakers should create a regulatory environment that provides a platform for diffuse 
securities ownership which may then deliver superior economic results. This underpins a modern 
                                                 
16 Carmichael and Pomerleano (n 5) 12 citing Ross Levine, Norman Loaya and Thorsten Beck, ‘Financial 
Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes’ (World Bank Development Research Group, 1999). 
17 Matthew Qvortrup, Angela Merkel Europe’s most influential leader (Duckworth Overlook, 2017) 338. 
18 Carmichael and Pomerleano (n 5) 198. 
19 Ibid 19. 
20 Ibid 346. 





economy.22 Why should the law matter? To whom does the law matter? ‘The essential insight 
underlying the ‘law matters’ thesis is that, in an unregulated environment, there is a real danger that 
a company’s ‘insiders’ (controlling shareholders and senior executives) will cheat outside investors 
who own equity’.23  
Indeed, this author’s empirical legal analysis of Australian NBFE related party transactions 
supports that insight. Expropriation of value also occurs by tunnelling,24 being non-related party 
transactions, addressed extensively in Germany and the EU through codified civil law duties of care 
and loyalty. Egregious transfer of shareholder value is facilitated by the narrow interpretation of 
fiduciary duty and the limited universe to which it is applied in Australia. 
The Law Matters thesis is not without its critics: ‘the historical experience in the US and the 
UK [casts] doubt on whether law is as pivotal and the thesis implies’.25 Its basic premise ‘seems 
irrefutable, but how much it matters indeed, is a matter of much conjecture’.26 In practice, the ‘law 
is one of many influences that shape economic development … differences in the nature and 
effectiveness of a country’s financial system depend on investor protection.’27 But the law is not the 
                                                 
22 Brian R Cheffins, 'Corporate Law and ownership structure: A Darwinian Link?' (2002) 25(2) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 346, 347, citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (Transaction, 1932). 
23 Brian R Cheffins, ‘Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public 
Companies’ (2003) 23(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 6. 
24 Li-Anne Elizabeth Woo, ‘The Importance of the Law Matters Thesis’ (2006) 3(4) Corporate Ownership & 
Control 219, 221, citing Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines and Andrei 
Shleifer, ‘Tunnelling’ (NBER Working Paper No 7523, 2000) 12. 
25 Cheffins (n 23). 
26 Woo (n 24) 226. 




only factor.28 To whom law matters, which law matters and options for its future development are 
proposed in this paper. 
1.2 Historical Background 
The story of modern Australia is a history of accretive statutory reform designed to promote 
economic development circumvented and corrupted by malfeasors using legal uncertainties and 
omissions to further their own interests. The accretive culture, fragmentation and complexity of 
Australian law leads to uncertainty, ambiguity, and enforcement deadweight costs for investor and 
regulators. If Australia wishes to pursue an agenda of increasing living standards based on agility 
and innovation, then law reform is an essential pre-condition.  
Traditional assumptions that private investors are rational, accessing and applying all 
disclosed information are false. More modern behavioural economics theory,29 leads to different 
conclusions and different regulatory postures. Behavioural economics recognises that investor 
biases and irrationality, often on the same set of disclosed facts in ‘complex situation-dependent 
ways’,30 lead to different behaviours and decisions. This need not, nor should it as some suggest, 
provide an excuse for further government intervention. It does emphasise a community need for 
financial literacy competencies and a regulatory posture that treats investors as financial consumers 
learning from their financial advisers who tutor them in teachable moments.  
Australia is a global outlier in many important aspects of its NBFE regulation, although not 
alone in its original Twin Peaks architecture. It does not follow international standards and practice. 
                                                 
28 Katharina Pistor, ‘Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1647, 1669. 
29 See, eg, the work of Richard H Thaler, Robert J Shiller, and Xavier Gabaix; R Thaler and C Sunstein, 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) 7. 




Specifically, it is almost unique in the use of trusts as large commercial trading enterprises, low 
licencing and capitalisation barriers to entry, limited fit and proper competency requirements, non-
adherence to many International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 1 & 11 provisions, regulation of custody, its poacher-
gamekeeper model for collective investment schemes (Managed Investment Schemes or MIS), and 
mismatch between trust law and modern portfolio theory. 
Its corporate governance regime has often failed those it purports to protect: the investing 
public. Failure is not rare. Remediation is costly, of limited financial veracity, with significant time 
elapsed to achieve limited results. Systemic and cyclical failures are found in the implementation of 
each element of the Wallis31 market model reforms (ie disclosure, advice, and financial literacy) of 
1997, including inter alia, financial adviser licencing, the Managed Investments Act and the Future 
of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms. There is limited commonality of view32 and public 
questioning of some of the basic tenets upon which Australia’s regulation of financial products and 
services is based. Market conduct regulation largely deals with problems after the event: unlike 
prudential supervision it doesn’t prevent them (not always successfully). Blame is being attached to 
the basic policy framework. But it is incomplete policy implementation and poor governance that 
has allowed systemic problems to manifest themselves. This unveiling ‘inspired a tornado of 
excoriating criticism of financial markets and their participants’.33 Corporate governance is the 
implementive cousin of market conduct regulation: prudential supervision is its sibling, 
accompanied by familial moral hazard. 
This research identifies more than 1,915,608 investors in Australia who have been 
financially damaged by corporate failures in NBFEs. Direct aggregate reported negative financial 
                                                 
31 S Wallis, Australian Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
March 1997). 
32 Kevin Davis, ‘Study of Financial System Guarantees’ (Australia Treasury, 2004) ch 2. 
33 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142. 
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impacts are estimated to be at least AUD52.25 billion over the study period (1981-2018). This lost 
capital is equivalent to c 0.46% of 2016 – 17 nominal Australian GDP. More importantly, because it 
is a cumulative misallocation of capital, it implies a foregone GDP growth rate of c 23.14% p.a. 
assuming GDP represents all Australian economic activity. Consistently, EU law reform of retail 
investor capital markets was estimated to increase EU GDP by ‘between 0.5 and 0.7% [pa].’34 The 
essential insight is that the cumulative misallocation of capital in aggregate ― the opportunity cost 
― causes lower economic growth. This is particularly so because NBFE financing is at the margin 
― it finances projects that would not otherwise occur including in regional areas. 
This data does not include consequential financial losses or other personal consequences. 
These losses are not aberrations. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
estimate that c AUD66.00 billion has been lost by investors in GFC related collapses from 2007-
9.35 These losses include entities that are not NBFEs. It can be misleading to blame the GFC for 
failures which should properly be attributed to other causes. The GFC merely exposed underlying 
systemic weaknesses. For instance, ASIC also estimate that c AUD20.00 billion of retail investment 
funds in NBFEs were ‘frozen’,36 some never to be recovered.  
Despite scholarly observations of ‘reasonable expectations’ in 200537 and some tactical 
regulatory change, very little has been implemented that would prevent another major collapse or 
                                                 
34 Friedrich Heinemann and Mathias Jopp, ‘The benefits of a Working European Retail Market for Financial 
Services: Report to European Financial Services Round Table’ (Institute für Europäische Politik, 
Berlin, 2002); See especially, Niamh Moloney, ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law: 
The 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’ (2005) 6 European Business Organisation Law 
Review 354 citing ZEW/IEP, ‘The Benefits of a Working European Retail Market for Financial 
Services’ (Report, European Financial Services Round Table, 2002). 
35 Tony D’Aloisio, ‘Responding to the global financial crisis: the ASIC Story’ (Speech delivered at the 
Trans-Tasman Business Circle, 30 November 2010). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Tuch (n 8) 478, 482 citing Paul Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principal’ (1989) 12 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 76, 84. 
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scandal involving a NBFE. Failure has been and will be cyclical. These failures arise from a number 
of systemic causes. These include: flawed business models; related party transactions and conflicts 
of interest; poor investor outcomes arising from conflicts of economic objectives through 
tunnelling; complete loss through legally compliant financial products and procedures; deceptive 
and misleading conduct; fraud; and under capitalisation. These manifestations of systemic failure 
arise from uncertainties in the law, practical impediments to its application, lack of harmonisation 
between sources of law, and lack of investment economic objectives being an integral part of the 
body of law in superannuation and non-superannuation environments. These factors lead to 
arbitrage opportunities for those inclined to mal-, mis-, or non-feasance. Australians (compulsorily) 
invest in an environment of a multitude of complex financial products (direct, corporate and 
superannuation) but are not afforded the protections they assume are there.  
Subsequent regulatory response has been directly related to the degree of public pressure 
from those aggrieved seeking remedies as a result of a crisis, or a report driven by economic policy 
objectives. Many of the responses have been lacking insight and are mostly tactical.38 However, 
these are not new issues: ‘the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s portrayed a failure of law, 
policy, and ethics’.39 The law provides the architecture and it can mitigate investor risk. Since 
NBFEs are derivative exposures of the underlying real economy, the law of itself cannot prevent the 
underlying attrition of those market linked assets. However, for some superannuation entities, 
Australian law now provides that directors and trustees must take into account market and longevity 
risks.  
Shifting policy sands, constantly changing regulation, regular judicial review, and 
subsequent statutory responses make it extraordinarily difficult for a non-professional director, a 
                                                 
38 Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, 'Developments in Financial Services Law of the last 30 years' (Speech 
delivered at the Banking and Finance Services Law Association 30th Annual Conference, Gold Coast 
QLD, Australia, 30 August 2013). 
39 Kirby (n 15). 
12 
 
director of a corporate trustee, or a trustee in person, to either understand the law or to properly 
discharge their duties. The present difficulty for regulatory reform in Australia is vested interest 
with differing objectives influencing a volatile political milieu.  
Judicial review has led the way in the development and enforcement of present law, noting 
the need for statutory reform. Judicial opinion has been scathing about the deficiencies and 
uncertainties in the law regulating Australian financial products and financial services.40 Other legal 
opinion is equally severe: ‘overly prescriptive, complex and poorly drafted [PDS]: The regime 
relies upon definitions within definitions and exceptions within exceptions. It is difficult for lawyers 
to get their heads around – let alone investors lacking in legal training’.41  
Australian law has been demonstrably deficient, especially compared with some 
comparative jurisdictions such as Canada, Germany and Singapore. Australian investors, other 
participants in the investment chain, and the broader economy have suffered as a result. Statutory 
reforms alone, whilst superficially attractive given the relative ease of implementation, have not and 
will not resolve systemic deficiencies in regulation nor their cyclical manifestations. 
                                                 
40 See, eg, Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42 [122] (Kirby J); 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 Summary 3 
(Rares J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian 
Holdings Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation)(Controllers appointed)(No 3) 
[2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 2013) [463] (Murphy J); Re Environvest Ltd (No 4) [2010] VSC 549 
[2]–[3] (Judd J); Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 [363] (Austin J); Australian Softwood Forests 
Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW); Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 [37] 
(Murphy J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] 
NSWSC 836 [17] (Barrett J) citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss 
Securities Ltd [2002] NSWSC 684 (Palmer J); Trilogy Funds Management Limited v Sullivan (No 2) 
[2015] FCA 1452 [1] (Wigney J); ASIC v Vines [2006] NSWSC 738 [14] (Austin J). 
41 Garry T Bigmore and Simon Rubenstein, ‘Rights of Investors in Failed or Insolvent Managed Investment 




1.3 Creeping Corruption in Australian NBFEs 
Creeping corruption, sometimes arising from grudging disclosure, aided by uncertain and complex 
law, poor advice and unknowledgeable investors is systemic in the Australian NBFE sector. This 
has resulted in investor disbelief and in some cases, significant judicial interventions. ‘[C]omplex 
legislation may mean that for those who deliberately seek not to comply with the law, they can 
readily do this…’.42 This has not been restricted to Australia: in the UK, such sentiments are 
expressed as creative compliance. UK legislative recognition of the economic importance of Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) was a driver of statutory reform43 to meet the ‘reasonable 
expectations of business people so that regulatory traps for the unwary are avoided’.44 Directors, 
particularly of private companies were considered not to be able to understand their duties. 
In Australia creative compliance or creeping corruption occurs where statutory provisions 
are interpreted narrowly and corruption escapes close scrutiny. In the longer term, this subverts the 
economic interests of investors and beneficiaries. The economic interests of investors and 
beneficiaries supported by holistic fiduciary standards in the investment chain is a different 
proposition from compliance with regulation. It leads to a different result: ‘It [Creative Compliance] 
is essentially the practice of using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and to do so with 
impunity’.45 
Australian regulation of financial products and financial services requires substantive law 
reform and reforms designed to enhance productivity in the economy. Without substantive reform, 
                                                 
42 Hui Xian Chia and Ian Ramsay, ‘Section 1322 as a response to the complexity of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth)’ (2015) 33 Companies & Securities Law Journal 389, 394. 
43 Companies Act 2006 (UK). 
44 John Lowry, ‘Codifying the corporate opportunity doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 2006’ (2012) 5 
International Review of Law 1, 3. 
45 Simon Ashby, ‘The Turner Review on the Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services 




there will be no remedy of the systemic deficiencies in regulation nor of their cyclical 
manifestations which harm productivity.  
Regulation can influence the growth of NBFIs[-Es] in two main ways: (a) repressive regulation 
can retard NBFI growth, and (b) inappropriate regulation or poorly designed regulatory 
structures can stimulate NBFI[-E] growth for the wrong reasons, often creating incentives for 
regulatory arbitrage and the emergence of unanticipated systemic problems.46 
Australian law permits the contracting out of fiduciary obligations. In retail financial advice, the 
Corporations Act subsumes general law fiduciary obligation beneath regulatory process, the result 
being a mismatch of community fiduciary expectation with industry practice. In superannuation, 
statutory intervention excludes access to the ‘general law relating to conflict of interest’.47 
Consequently, significant numbers of investors in Australia today have lost their trust in the 
financial system. Community expectations of, and trust in what each market participant should do is 
often different from what they actually do. These ambiguities have led investors to a false sense of 
security which was sadly and damagingly misplaced. Whilst Australia has benefited from its Twin 
Peaks market based regulatory system (posited by this author to be ‘Triple Peaks’, given the integral 
role of the industrial system in superannuation savings),48 and has arguably progressed toward the 
first objective of an entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with its global peers in many 
asset classes, the second objective, being investment stability and risk mitigation, has for many 
people been an abject disaster.  
This author’s empirical analysis quantifies those direct losses and analyses the economic 
consequences to the nation. It demonstrates that failure is predictable, cyclical, and has deep legal 
                                                 
46 Carmichael and Pomerleano (n 5) 208. 
47 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 58B. 




systemic roots.49 This empirical data points to failures of law on a massive scale. It also points to 
legal solutions to the problem of anti-entrepreneurial repressive legislation (accretive statute) and to 
solutions to unanticipated systemic failures particularly of vertically integrated NBFEs in a 
consolidating market. These solutions can also be applied to NBFE entities associated with 
commercial banks. There has been no quantitative assessment of the costs to the economy of legal 
complexity and uncertainty. These costs include compliance, director and trustee insurance, limited 
mutual recognition through lack of harmonisation, reduced capital inflows, reduced real economy 
investment, and reform fatigue.50  
Some might argue reform solutions will reduce the entrepreneurial capacity of the 
Australian economy. The contrary is the case. Restore the trust and the economy will respond. The 
economic losses directly incurred by investors and beneficiaries, added to foregone investment that 
may have taken place, has resulted in Australia having an economy reliant less upon domestic 
savings and more upon foreign capital to finance new business investment. The reform objective 
must be to re-establish trust, confidence and respect, which has been lost in several decades of often 
anonymous or poorly-informed financial product selling to vulnerable retail investors, despite 
repeated analysis and with similar conclusions from 2001.51  
Reform requires significant elapsed time, probably a decade, and it must be sequenced. 
Strategic reform requires acceptance and implementation by the various stakeholder groups. 
Tactical reforms can be imposed legislatively. The effectiveness and stability generated by 
prudential supervision needs to be embedded as a governance value system – a culture – within the 
                                                 
49 David G Millhouse, ‘Systemic and Cyclical Failure in Australian Financial Services and Financial 
Products Sectors: Have weaknesses in law contributed to these failures?’ (PhD thesis, Bond University, 
2019) ch 3 tab 3.25. 
50 Hui Xian Chia and Ian Ramsay, ‘Section 1322 as a response to the complexity of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth)’ (2015) 33 Companies & Securities Law Journal 389, 403. 




non-prudentially regulated NBFE sector. Successful implementation aligns interest of provider and 
consumer: it also changes the role of the regulators: they become educators, supervisors. A healthy 
culture results in enforcement becoming a last resort. 
1.4 Reform Implementation Objectives 
The neo-classical market model as envisaged by Campbell52 and Wallis sought to create a 
regulatory environment that led to investment opportunities that did not exist previously and may 
not otherwise have existed at all. Given the societal need for a sound NBFE sector, these market 
freedoms were not matched by effective implementation of the strategic underpinnings of Wallis, 
being disclosure, advice, and investor empowerment and knowledge through education, nor in 
many cases, corporate governance responsibility and ethical standards enforced by the application 
of fiduciary principles. 
Australia has not been alone in seeking to implement reform of its financial sectors. There 
are and will be contested reform agendas. These include the tension between investor empowerment 
and libertarian paternalism.53 Their resolution will depend on acceptance of the reasons for failure. 
International precedent provides a framework, offering three options.54 Were the Wallis and other 
Australian market reforms faulty, or was their implementation faulty (if only because of political 
constraints)? Were there sequencing issues, or a simplification of the links between desired 
economic outcome and legal reform? Were the reforms incomplete?55 
                                                 
52 Sir Keith Campbell, Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Cat No 8104251, Canberra, 1981). 
53 Jeremy Cooper, Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure, and operation of Australia’s 
Superannuation System (Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 2010). 
54 Nancy Birdsall, Augustus de la Torre and Felipe Valencia Caidedo, The Washington Consensus ― 
Assessing a Damaged Brand (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 5316, May 2010) 21. 
55 The Washington Consensus is a package of economic policy objectives, including deregulation of 




Analysis, in a different but comparable context, ‘blames the poor post-reform outcomes on 
uneven and incomplete reform implementation’.56 Political interest generates contested reform 
implementation in Australia. Similarly, in the US, trade protectionism since 2016 challenges the 
Washington Consensus and is inconsistent with delayed reform and statutory repeal in its financial 
services markets, or indeed the rollback of previous reform.57 Whatever the architecture, political 
constraints to reform implementation come at a price to the financial consumer. 
1.5 Four Distinctive Periods 
The history of the development of the law of the Australian financial services and products 
regulatory sector would be incomplete without an understanding of the economic conditions which 
drove the development of the legal framework. This framework can be divided into four primary 
periods: The Age of Entrepreneurship and Deregulation (1981-2001), The Age of Disquiet (2002-
2009), The Age of Reaction (2010-2013) and the Age of Statutes and Compliance (2014 et seq). It 
illustrates the tension between market based principles of Australian financial system regulation and 
those that oppose or seek to modify a market based approach, these tensions embedded in 
Australian statutes. 
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Relevant law includes a number of statutes and their interaction with the general law. The 
primary legislative instruments which seek to regulate director, officer, and trustee responsibility for 
the governance of NBFEs are the Corporations Act,58 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act,59 
and the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act.60 The three primary regulators are 
subject to their own legislation: ASIC Act61 (market conduct), APRA Act62 (prudential supervision), 
and Fair Work Act63 (the link between Australia’s industrial and superannuation systems). As 
Murray64 and Heydon65 demonstrate, this interface is largely unexplored territory, resulting in 
Australia being an outlier in financial regulation. The much vaunted ‘Twin Peaks’ in effect becomes 
‘Triple Peaks’ with as yet unknown consequences. There is considerable additional relevant 
legislation including the Competition and Consumer Act.66 There are sectoral governance rules and 
standards,67 and Codes of Conduct, proposed by Hayne to be enforceable.68 
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2.  Preparing for the Future 
Australian law and regulation of financial products and services has largely developed in response 
to crises and public policy imperatives.69 These 
[c]rises are more likely to reveal critical features of a complex system that remains undetected 
in the normal state. The purpose of a crisis analysis is not primarily to understand the cause of a 
specific corporate governance failure, but to learn about the system in which this failure 
occurred.70 
Hayne is the latest significant extra-curial and judicial writing, followed by legislative reform of 
statutes. The ‘institutional autops[ies]’71 of major cases have steadily, if haphazardly, focussed and 
enhanced the duties of directors and trustees with a plethora of judicial interventions over this 
period in response to the cyclical nature of the underlying systemic problems unearthed. In 
Australia, 
[t]he law regulating managed investment schemes (and other commercial trusts) remains 
seriously inadequate, a situation that should be regarded as intolerable in respect of entities that 
are permitted to raise funds from the public … Australian trust law … suffers fundamental 
structural weaknesses as a system for regulating large and complex enterprise entities.72 
Reform needs: ‘a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; 
understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with 
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societies’ goals…’73 and resisting ‘fine tuning regulations’.74 Hayne agrees,75 providing limited 
specific recommendations but importantly, emphasising the need for wider reform. 
‘The sad news is that the general approach to reforms [ha]s largely still been based on an 
outmoded and by now largely repudiated conceptual concept of regulations, which does not start 
from the “system-wide” characteristics of risks and often misses key risks’.76  
The starting point for Australian reform is where empirical analysis identifies a 90% greater 
or equal correlation between selected variables.77 Related party transactions and misleading and 
deceptive conduct are closely correlated (93.42%). This Tactical implementation can be achieved 
through the harmonisation of directors and trustee duties, reform of the use of trusts as commercial 
investment entities, and the international harmonisation of Australian corporate governance and 
financial product standards.  
Specifically, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), MiFID 1 and 11, embrace of the Global Corporate Governance Standard,78 
licensing and capitalisation, and asserting the primacy of fiduciary and fiduciary-like responsibility. 
Consistency between in-country reforms and globally is sound policy. To not achieve at least these 
results risks the Australian NBFE funds management industry becoming a global outlier with 
negative economic consequences. These strategies may also render reform less politically 
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contentious. IOSCO has a well-defined assessment and implementation process including for 
market confidence and integrity, investor protection, and reduction of financial crime.79 
Risks will remain: ‘a fully “fail-proof” financial system may not be the most efficient in 
delivering economic growth or other desirable outcomes’,80 including the development of financial 
literacy competencies as an alternative to libertarian paternalism. There could be ‘less emphasis on 
formal rules and give more discretion to [reformed] supervisory agencies … perhaps avoid the 
proliferation of rules that may add more costs than they provide benefits and may even increase 
overall risks’,81 a suggestion consistent with this author. 
Harmonisation includes the need to address the scope and importance of applying fiduciary 
principles to governance of the NBFE sector. The objective should be quality assurance of the 
investment chain for the benefit of the financial consumer. This is an accepted principle in other 
scholarly disciplines. The duties and responsibilities of directors and directors of trustees and 
registered organisations are not consistent across the Corporations Act, Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) (SIS) Act, and Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act. Presently, there 
are differing statutory interventions ranging from none to significantly prescribed statutory 
fiduciary duties in the governance of superannuation entities, a greater statutory intervention than 
embodied in the Corporations Act. The backgrounds of directors and trustees influence their 
understanding of and implementation of fiduciary principles, and the personal risks they assume 
arising from these roles.  
Inconsistencies in the law have led to opportunistic behaviour by some directors and 
trustees. Whilst arguably complying with statute, they do not follow the spirit of the law and do not 
optimise investor outcomes. In some cases, despite the provisions of statutes and general law, 
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shareholders and unitholders have been asked to approve, usually through a sequence of 
transactions, often between related parties including directors and entities controlled by them, 
outcomes which are suboptimal and which enrich those who govern the NBFE. Sober analysis 
reveals outcomes which, had they been concluded in a single transaction, would be prima facie 
cases of non-, mis- and malfeasance.  
The law governing the supply of financial products and services by NBFEs is a field where 
opposing political, social, and economic interests compete intensively.82 NBFEs and their regulators 
operate in a political milieu. It is assumed that there is a level playing field in Australian regulation. 
This may not be the case. Some NBFEs have better access to agents of the state than others and 
governance structures that can influence political outcomes unavailable to others.83  
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3.  The Economic Effect of Inaction 
The financial system is based on trust.84 Hayne notes ‘[r]arely, if ever, was there explicit 
examination of, or comparison between, the costs of doing nothing and the costs and consequences 
of changing the rules’.85 This empirical analysis has now been undertaken.86 
There is a considerable historical literature on the relationship between law and economics. 
These include assertions of efficiency and inducement of efficiency of common law based on 
judicial interpretations of fairness, justice, and rights;87 legislative capture by special interest 
groups;88 the economics of models of regulation;89 and legal empirical analysis.90 ‘There is a very 
general need for empirical work on the legal system to be undertaken’.91 That includes definition of 
efficiency: economists apply consumer welfare benefit rather than legal efficiency. In Australia, 
examples of legislative capture include the FoFA and registered organisation reforms, both 
contested by interest groups and politicised. Reform of superannuation fund governance remains 
contested. Each of these examples should be subjected to the spotlight of empirical legal analysis to 
improve economic outcomes for their respective financial consumers. 
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That the Australian economy has not developed its innate entrepreneurial qualities into an 
ecosystem comparable with the US92 and Germany is in part a result of legal uncertainties and 
complexities. Foregone economic activity is also a function of the loss of capital quantified by 
empirical analysis and consequential risk aversion of Australian investors, institutional and private, 
from the losses resulting from an inchoate regulatory system. It is not possible for a risk seeking 
entrepreneurial ecosystem to grow sustainably with such a loss of capital. Hence the paucity of 
capital availability for Australian SMEs. These companies wither. 
Some authors93 claim causality between legal origins and financial market outcomes, a 
primary legal distinction being common and civil law origins.  
Legal protections not only facilitate diversification of financial commitments by the existing 
investor base, but also and in addition, must encourage small investors to put their savings in 
equity. This then leads to the broadening of the investor base which is associated with bigger 
and deeper markets. Thus law begets markets.94 
Comparative law research supports this conclusion. Similarly, differing jurisdictions change market 
practices using methods other than legal tools to implement policy reform: ‘law is hardly ever the 
only or even the culprit of a crisis. Conversely, legal solutions are not necessarily the most 
important remedy … actual change is contingent on non-legal factors...’95 The importance of 
behavioural economics research is understated and under-researched in Australia, where emphasis 
on statutory accretion serves as ‘diagnostic tools for policy reform’96 without applying the insights 
from comparative jurisdictions. Emphasis on objective strategy based on multiple tools in Australia 
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would serve to reduce the impact of interest group driven politicised policy recently experienced in 
the financial planning and superannuation sectors.  
Community expectations of, and trust in what each market participant should do has often 
been different from what they actually do. ‘Be under no illusion, there is still a trust deficit between 
investor and customer…’97 Ambiguities lead to a false sense of security which have been sadly and 
damagingly misplaced. ‘Lilliputian battles … whose petty victories ... were trumpeted in the 
columns of their fawning acolytes in the press’98 gave comfort that these problems were being 
resolved. These battles continue. Wallis inspired principles of disclosure, advice, and financial 
literacy, whilst commendable, have been implemented with a certain naivety leading to severe 
personal and nationwide economic damage.  
One court likened Australia’s financial services and financial products industries to Dante’s 
Inferno. It chose vivid adjectives ‘byzantine’ and ‘purgatorial’.99 This speaks loudly of the need for 
rational reform in the provision of financial products and financial services. Reform objectives must 
be to re-establish trust, confidence and respect, lost in several decades of often anonymous or 
poorly-informed financial product selling to vulnerable retail investors, despite repeated analysis 
and with similar conclusions from 2001.100  
The goal of reform must be clearly directed at restoring public trust, confidence, and respect. 
Fundamentally, this requires recognition of fiduciary obligations to investors and beneficiaries often 
wrongly assumed by them to exist. Directors, trustees, and those that advise them are responsible. 
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Often not deliberately dishonest, sometimes ‘messianic’101 but nonetheless not fit and proper in any 
meaningful sense.  
Disclosure is not always understood by readers and has not prevented manifest conflicts of 
economic interest in the management of those activities. In the application of the second Wallis 
principle, financial advice, there is a distinction between the general law duties of skill and care and 
fiduciary obligation, constrained by associated contractual provisions in the relationship and the 
Corporations Act. Investors may be surprised to learn that in 2019 there is no statutory fiduciary 
duty to the client in respect of this second limb of Wallis. The assumption that fiduciary principles 
always apply is false. They do not, and the fact that statutory application of fiduciary principles was 
proposed to apply to what was sold as professional advice speaks volumes for the corrupted ethical 
cultures of the organisations and individuals involved. The typology ‘dealer group’ implies 
something other than professional advice. It speaks loudly of systemic deficiencies in Australia’s 
financial culture, but a deficient statutory solution. The general law fiduciary standard is now 
subsumed by a statutory best interest duty. This does not apply in other jurisdictions. Hayne does 
not address this issue other than termination of ‘grandfathered’ commissions, now publicly 
contested. 
Even before Hayne,102 large Australian financial institutions added to the unease by needing 
to compensate clients for advice that was contracted but not provided. Whilst this is not of itself a 
breach of fiduciary duty, it underscores legal uncertainty in the mind of a layperson, a financial 
consumer. Fiduciary duties in Australia are not directly concerned with the quality of advice, 
although that quality may differ depending on whether any fiduciary duty obligations are 
discharged or not.  
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In the US, there is a similar debate, politicised as in Australia, also extending to the 
regulators. Retail investors (Moms and Dads) typically are exposed to brokers and, separately, 
investment advisers. There has been no uniform fiduciary standard for brokers and investment 
advisers, although there has been a best interest test. Brokers have typically earned a fee from 
product manufacturers and mutual funds whilst making suitable recommendations and in some 
cases managing client accounts, whereas investment advisers typically earn an asset based fee. The 
US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) intended a uniform fiduciary standard for all retail 
investor retirement advice. The SEC has the regulatory power under Dodd-Frank103 but political 
division and continued lobbying has prevented implementation. Financial professionals who 
provide advice related to retirement monies must act as fiduciaries (in the US interpretation of 
fiduciary) and brokers who manage retirement monies must act with best interest, and similarly for 
non-retirement accounts where they have investment discretion or asset related fees. Fiduciary 
responsibilities are to be underpinned in enforceable best interest contracts. Judicial review in the 
US and Canada has extended fiduciary relationships ‘to be used for creating new forms of civil 
wrong’, being from an Australian perspective an ‘unsatisfactory development of the law of 
fiduciary obligation’.104  
Investors may also be interested to learn that a custodian in Australia does not necessarily 
have the meaning assumed by an investing layperson. There is a disconnection between public 
expectation and industry practice. Many people assume that the mere attribution of the custody title 
confers fiduciary duty and protection to an investor akin to a trustee. It does not. Deficiencies in the 
Australian custody sector were identified in 2003 and Australian law still does not follow 
international standards.   
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4.  Community Expectations ― Disconnection with the ‘Twin Peaks’ Model of 
Regulation and Supervision 
Community expectation is tempered by belief systems, behavioural norms, and financial 
competencies leading to systemic misunderstandings based upon ‘limited ability to unravel 
risks...’105  
Discussion of expectation, culture, and intervention is incomplete without a wider view of 
the value to individual investors and the entrepreneurial economy of investors having access to 
various types of financial product, including MIS. Should the libertarian paternalism espoused by 
Cooper106 in respect of superannuation investment be copied in these other investment asset 
classes? If so, what is the effect on the entrepreneurial economy? At an individual level, would such 
policy enhance financial literacy? Probably not, since impairment of capital is one element of 
understanding risk. Some jurisdictions do restrict retail investor access to many types of financial 
product,107 a consequence being more reliance on government and less individual endeavour. 
However, this is not the optimal response to the systemic problems in Australia. ‘Where should 
responsibility for citizens’ longer term financial security lie?’108 Policy conflicts arise from investor 
realisations post-NBFE collapses where ‘little active supervision is revealed, financial consumers 
are incredulous, angry and mistrustful’.109 Disclosure assumes that ‘all investors are the same’110 
and make informed decisions. This is not the case, despite their having responsibility for decision 
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making. In Australia, there are ‘limited and sparse existing programs of investor education and 
assistance’,111 with ASIC concluding that ‘investor education is worthwhile though it must be 
pursued in the long term in tandem with other strategies that build in the fact that retail investors are 
not the hard-headed decision makers often supposed.’112 Implicit recognition of the importance of 
behavioural economics theory. 
Expectations gaps between regulators and stakeholders ‘resonate today, arising as they do 
out of legal and technical difficulties in applying a single regime to a disparate collection of 
investment and quasi-investment arrangements that utilise different legal forms and are used for 
different commercial purposes’.113 This is particularly so for unregistered MIS and those common 
enterprise MIS where there may be no tangible trust property, investor benefits being limited to 
chose in action, sometimes only exercisable through conflicted power of attorney. Desire for 
retribution from those aggrieved has been compounded by ASIC not choosing ‘to use enforcement 
as a primary means of shaping MIS jurisprudence’,114 although the NBFE cases do not support that 
proposition. More recent policy directions to address culture, director and investor education seek to 
facilitate its mandate by lifting ethical and educational standards across its regulated universe. If 
continued, these strategies are generational and rebalance ASIC as a Responsive Regulator, less 
reliant upon statutory compliance and more focussed on the import of fiduciary concepts. 
One of the benefits of Australia’s Twin Peaks model is the application of differing 
approaches to similar problems. A primary difference between ASIC, APRA, and the Registered 
Organisations Commission (ROC)) is the number and diversity of NBFE entities regulated. APRA 
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is more closely involved with its regulated entities through ex ante supervision than ASIC with its 
ex post market conduct model, until recently largely adversarial, relying on court based 
enforcement.115 The former makes for relational regulation based upon earlier interventions. 
ASIC’s recent focus on culture and education makes for a more relational environment: Responsive 
Regulation. This form of regulation ‘champions internalisation … it is usually impossible for 
society to organise its resources so that rewards and punishments await every act of compliance or 
non-compliance’.116 The objective is to achieve compliance by internal means, sometimes 
underscored by means of enforceable undertakings,117 commonly used in Australian financial 
services and financial products regulation.  
Active involvement (common in prudentially regulated entities) can diffuse required 
behaviours into NBFE governance and at many levels of the entity, not just its compliance 
management. This would require additional skills sets in ASIC to embrace microeconomic analysis 
and its inclusion in disclosure documents. It would be an ex ante extension of present licencing 
powers to prevent, restore and rehabilitate. It balances its ex post adversarial powers. ‘This would 
mean a cultural change in firms and the board and senior management working to change the 
acceptance of regulators in firms’.118 Such policy does not have the ‘public drama of 
prosecutions’.119 Lack of public confidence has resulted in ASIC’s review of its Australian 
                                                 
115 See, eg, Helen Louise Bird et al, ASIC Enforcement Patterns (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities 
Regulation, University of Melbourne Law School, 2003). 
116 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive Regulation in the financial services sector’ 
(2011) 44 (3) University of British Columbia Law Review 702. 
117 Ibid 704. 
118 Ibid 738. 




Financial Services Licence (AFSL) and Credit Licence banning powers concurrently with the 
introduction of the Banking Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR) for ADIs.120 
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5. Community Expectations ― Gap with Market Practices in the Governance of 
Financial Products and Services 
A consumer of financial products and services is often vulnerable because of lack of experience and 
expertise in investment. This vulnerability should enliven fiduciary obligations. The important 
characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is one of trust and confidence, the fiduciary acting for or on 
behalf of the interests of another.121 The fiduciary power must be exercised in the interests of the 
investor or client with no unauthorised profit or conflict accruing to the fiduciary. Fiduciary 
relationships should occur at every point in the investment chain where there is discretion or advice. 
Economic interest of the ultimate consumer should be paramount. The beneficiary must have 
confidence in the agent even if that agent is several steps removed. Trust in the investment chain is 
only as ‘strong as the trust in the weakest link of that investment chain’.122 Defining status-based 
fiduciaries is fundamental. 
Directors are often placed in situations of conflict of interest and conflict of economic 
objective by virtue of the architecture of their organisations. Considerable systemic risk is generated 
by related party transactions and consequential conflicts of interests and objectives. These occur in 
a complex investment chain controlled by multiple intermediaries and is incompatible with the 
concept of a fiduciary having stewardship of client property. Related party transactions are common 
in NBFEs.  
Present financial advice regulation is directed at prioritisation rather than prohibition of 
conflicted dealings. For financial products subject to trust general law or its statutory 
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implementation in the SIS Act, there is prohibition, although not exclusively.123 Murray124 noted 
that there is increasing industry consolidation and vertical integration. This results in increasing 
number of related parties and increased potential for conflicts of interest.125 ASIC’s report 
particularly relates to financial product manufacturing and distribution, outsourcing, fiduciary 
obligations, remuneration, ownership interests, and use of information. These and other conflicts 
also arise in prudentially regulated NBFEs. ASIC specifically suggests ‘better training for 
directors’,126 the ‘engagement of separate external legal advisers’ in conflicts of a fiduciary 
nature,127 and cultural responses to conflicts management 128 to disrupt ‘systemic conduct that is 
driven by poor culture’.129 
But, conflicts and the taking of profits have often arisen permitted by the subsuming of 
fiduciary principles by contract and statute. Australian Softwood Forests is an earlier, but not 
unusual example: ‘The schemes are generally designed so that all the investors ever receive are the 
pieces of paper constituting the agreements … promoters design increasingly more sophisticated 
schemes in attempts to circumvent the laws’.130 
Directors of companies and trustees have differing fiduciary responsibilities. ‘As a general 
rule, all powers vested in directors under the company’s articles are fiduciary powers to be 
                                                 
123 APRA, Conflicts of interest (at July 2013) Prudential Standard SPS 521. 
124 Australian Government The Treasury, Financial System Final Report (2014). 
125 ASIC, Culture, conduct and conflicts of interest in vertically integrated businesses in the fund-
management industry (Report 474, March 2016). 
126 Ibid 106. 
127 Ibid 123.  
128 Ibid 168. 
129 Ibid 28. 
130 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW); Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 




exercised in the interests of the company’.131 Fiduciary responsibilities are also set out in statute, 
specifically the Corporations Act and SIS Act, but not in the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) 
Amendment Act where general law fiduciary duty traditionally applied in the context of dependence. 
The director of a trustee and a director of another entity associated with the asset can 
concurrently be the same person managing the same underlying assets. This is one of many 
conundrums leading to uncertainty in NBFE governance. Harmonisation of fiduciary duty across 
the governance of the NBFE sector is required to eliminate inconsistency in the law. Like the 
cleansing effects of economic recession, a statutory prohibition on conflicts of interest is required to 
eliminate ambiguity, uncertainty, and redevelop lost confidence in a market based regulatory 
system. Statutory interventions prioritise not prohibit. This is dangerous for beneficiary, client, and 
trustee director alike. They do not resolve the cultural problems identified by Heydon, opining that 
poor culture drives poor conduct. Nor Hayne’s concern for the confluence of law and morality. 
There is no controversy over the existence and scope of a fiduciary’s fundamental 
proscriptive duties, although there may be [is]132 over the precise nature and extent of them.133 
There is ‘no standard test to be applied to determine whether the parties are within a fiduciary 
relationship’.134 It depends on the facts and the context, including ‘contractual arrangements’.135 
The essence of the fiduciary relationship is the exercise of power by one party for the benefit of 
another, the principles being: ‘unless there are some special circumstances in the relationship, the 
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duties that equity demands from the fiduciary will be limited to what he described as the ‘two core 
obligations’ relating to unauthorised benefits and conflicts of interest’.136 
The determining factor is ‘the well-established rule that the scope of the fiduciary duties in a 
particular relationship will vary and is to be determined according to the nature of the relationship 
and the facts of the particular case’.137  
The need to analyse each discrete case for fiduciary obligation strikes at the heart of the 
systemic cause of the chasm between client or investor expectations and market practices in 
financial services advice or financial products selling. There have been misplaced expectations by 
investors in NBFE financial products and services transactions that there is a relationship based in 
fiduciary principles. Part of the mismatch in expectations has been poor financial literacy and 
misunderstanding of the law (including fiduciary law), but part is innate trust based on fiduciary 
principles assumed by investors in professional persons with whom they deal. 
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6. Statutes at Variance ― Uncertainty in Directors and Trustee Duties 
NBFE directors are confronted by overlapping and confusing trust law, general law and statutory 
provisions. They can rarely be certain of their duties. This confusion extends to those who invest in 
their entities, their legal advisers and to those determining whether appointees meet fit and proper 
criteria.138 ‘A legal vacuum has been created by the evolution of the trust as a vehicle for large scale 
enterprise, and the apparent tardiness of Australian legislatures to accommodate this 
development’.139 ‘[T]rustee-directors should not have to collate rules from multiple sources in order 
to understand their core duties’.140 
There are differing standards applying to director duties under the Fair Work Act 
(Registered Organisations) Amendment Act, Corporations Act, and SIS Act. Many NBFEs are 
multifunction financial institutions of considerable size subject to regulation by or the influence of 
each of these statutes. 
Like Esau and Jacob, ‘vying for power even in their mother’s womb’,141 the jurisdictional 
differences in history, culture, and desire for specific types of governance lead to a zero sum game. 
Whilst there may be some tactical reform, these struggles for power and influence have not 
necessarily improved conditions for the people they purport to protect. ‘Appointees [to the Fair 
Work Commission] are regularly described as “union friendly” or “employer friendly”’ giving rise 
to ‘claims of bias’.142 Neither is there unanimity of professional opinion as to the solutions.143 The 
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Corporations Act impacts on ‘ASIC’s ability both to respond to the recommendations made in this 
report, and on its ongoing and future ability to fulfil its mandate efficiently and effectively’.144 It 
cites ‘legislative and regulatory complexity … and in particular the application of the Corporations 
Act’.145 From 1981–2018, its word count has increased from 257 419 to 729 056.146 These concerns 
are ‘shared by numerous members of the judiciary who note that ‘every significant amendment to 
the corporations legislation … has added substantially to complexity’ such that it is now 
“inescapably complex”’147 ‘Treacherous’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘as clear as mud’, are other judicial 
adjectives.148 Cooper has previously proposed a rewrite of the SIS Act citing complexity grounds.149 
To add to the confusion, four recent reform proposals have failed or struggled to gain necessary 
political support,150 with compromised reform to the governance of registered organisations finally 
enacted in December 2016.151 
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These sentiments are not new. ‘There is a point where company law ends and trust law takes 
over’,152 not a distinction recognised by many directors. Many NBFEs, particularly MIS and 
superannuation entities, are trusts with a corporate trustee. Trust structures were not originally 
intended to be used for risk seeking commercial business activities, or to be leveraged with debt to 
fund those activities. An MIS is a trust. Trust law applies.153 These distinctions apply particularly to 
unregistered and/or insolvent MIS, transfers of property by a fiduciary, superannuation entities, 
asset allocation decisions or cases involving Canadian and US participants.  
For directors of complex NBFEs, these legal uncertainties, overlaid with beneficiary and 
investor expectations of value outcomes rather than rights make for difficult territory. In Sino Iron, 
‘[t]o require that a defendant must actually appreciate that the relevant facts constitute a trust in law 
would favour the legally ignorant over the legally aware, when the facts and knowledge are 
otherwise identical’.154 
In Imobilari v Opes Prime, ‘Again, one might justifiably question whether even the trained 
legal mind is capable of making such fine distinctions.’155 ‘[T]here is a clear twin policy imperative 
for pursuing legislative reform of the Corporations [Act] law ― to both simplify and contemporise 
the law’.156 
Since trusts and MIS are not legal entities, they cannot become insolvent. There has not 
been a body of law developed to administer situations where the assets of the trust are not sufficient 
to meet the liabilities required to be discharged by the trustee or the RE, themselves normally 
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contractually indemnified from those assets. Consequently, directors and trustees need to 
understand multiple and inconsistent statutory provisions, general law, and equity.  
The insolvency provisions of the Corporations Act relating to formal administration, 
receivership, and liquidation do not apply to trusts and MIS. Registered MIS have some limited 
statutory provision,157 not applying to unregistered MIS. The trustee or RE may become insolvent 
whilst it administers entities where their underlying assets are insufficient to meet creditor 
liabilities. There are also cases where the trustee or RE also administer trusts and MIS which are 
commercially sound, although the trustee or RE is not. Further complications arise where leverage, 
sometimes multiple layers of it, is part of the capital structure. For trusts and MIS which are listed 
on the ASX of other securities exchanges, the listing rules apply to the trust or the MIS, but not to 
the trustee or RE and their directors. 
Personal liability in commercial trusts is also different in the US, being statute limited for 
investors,158 by trust law for trustees159, and for investors in Canadian trusts by provincial statute.160 
In Singapore, its Business Trust Act161 eliminates personal liability for unitholders whilst extending 
personal fiduciary liability of trustee directors to them. 
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7.  The Ascent to Uncertainty 
There is no commonality of strategy and no policy consistency from the competing political parties. 
Empirical research demonstrates that ideological orientation influences regulatory policy.162 There 
is a moral hazard in that investor expectations may assume that the regulatory system is designed as 
a zero failure policy. It is not. There needs to be realistic community expectations as to what 
regulation and supervision can achieve in practice. 
Despite Australia’s elaborate regulatory architecture, which of itself contributed to these 
community expectations, Australia has a regulatory malaise in the NBFE sector which the 
inconsistencies of, and conflicts of interest in, public policy are ill-equipped to remedy. The current 
system is complex and ineffective.163 The report into ASIC itself demonstrates clearly that there are 
‘broad systemic problems in the financial advice industry’ which may recur.164  
It is manifestly important that Australia subscribe to international regulatory standards and 
that its own funds management products and services can be readily available in other jurisdictions. 
As with financial literacy, this should be seen as a productivity measure. Financial products 
harmonisation with international standards could assist Australia develop commonality of strategy 
and consistency in public policy. It would also remove some of its systemic deficiencies in the 
regulation of financial products and services and improve access to capital for companies, another 
productivity measure. 
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Whether there should be a single prudential regulator for the entire financial system was 
addressed in 1996,165 and 2009,166 and by Hayne. Prima facie, there may be argument for 
combination of the regulatory functions into one entity since many NBFEs are regulated by both 
ASIC, APRA, ATO, ROC and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
This argument does not survive insightful scrutiny.167 Hayne agrees, recommending increased 
periodic reviews (and a Capability Review of APRA). All five regulators, in the same jurisdiction, 
are required to develop policy responses and manage problematic issues which have some 
commonality. Their differing powers and cultures result in differing responses. This is a useful 
outcome and leads to a more diverse regulatory response based on learning and differing knowledge 
bases which can be shared. That is not to say that prudential regulation cannot be applied by ASIC 
to the managed funds industry, only that it has a different result to that applied by APRA.  
Johnson168 is of the view that the separation of responsibilities has served Australia well. 
Cooper not favouring a single regulator approach ― and without explicitly criticising Wallis, is 
intent on moving away from its paradigm under the guise of improving outcomes for members on 
the basis that ‘members are not in a position to drive changes themselves’;169 ie Wallis’ third limb 
of financial literacy has not worked in practice for superannuation NBFEs. Investor financial 
literacy is stated to be ‘an important long term goal, but a compulsory superannuation system 
cannot depend on all its participants having the skills necessary’.170 Cooper is of the view that 
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‘disclosure is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for ensuring that member interests 
prevail’.171 This demonstrates a lack of confidence in Wallis’ first limb. The remaining limb, 
advice, has been addressed elsewhere, but trustees are likely to have greatly extended obligations to 
members in the provision of advice to those members. 
Whilst Cooper does not envisage APRA’s role extending to intervening directly in trustee 
decisions, trustee directors are now subject to significantly enhanced statutory liability for 
beneficiary outcomes. This has major implications for director appointments, remuneration, and 
insurance. The tradition of general law principles based regulation rather than prescriptive statutory 
regulation has led to differing interpretations by directors, the regulators, and the courts.  
There is further tension between regulation and supervision.172 The Wallis posture of 
regulation based on intervention proportionate to the problem is different from direct oversight of 
financial institutions. Superannuation entities are subject to ex ante supervision, often active. MIS 
and other NBFEs are subject to ex post conduct regulation. Harmonisation needs to occur with 
ASIC moving to an ex ante supervisory agency, and applying prudential supervision to registered 
MIS and other NBFEs. This would improve ASIC’s ability to meet community expectation without 
destroying the three central tenets of Wallis: disclosure, advice and investor empowerment. ASIC 
would be able to focus on necessary reform of the MIS sector envisaged by the Corporations and 
Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC),173 at least in part. This includes elimination of the 
poacher/gamekeeper problem and proper prudential capital arrangements for MIS. It would also 
diminish the consequences of damaging ex post regulatory action on third parties since the NBFE 
market would become accustomed to a culture of supervision, different from regulation. Restoring 
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the prescribed interest dual party system does not of itself provide better investor protection, 
although it would considerably widen the opportunity for remedy in the absence of MIS prudential 
regulation.  
For the market to hold directors to account, the third limb, investor empowerment, as 
Cooper acknowledges, has limited success, and requires new strategy and common statutory 
interventions. Lifting financial literacy standards in Australia should be seen as a productivity 
policy and responsibility for its implementation given to an agency other than ASIC. Poor financial 
literacy is a common theme in the cases. 
The alternative to investor empowerment is libertarian paternalism which has its own 
dangers. This philosophy of libertarian paternalism espoused by Cooper and enacted in a 
compulsory contributory superannuation system reform supposedly to ‘maximise outcomes for 
passive superannuation fund members whilst allowing the actively engaged to select their own 
direction’.174 Echoes of paternalism are to be found in MIS. For instance, the proposed liability of 
financial product manufacturers (normally fund managers) for the suitability of the product for 
specific investors is a preferred reform proposed by ASIC and includes a best interests duty and 
prohibitions or limitations on financial product availability. The result would be to extend product 
liability to the product originator and require them to have the infrastructure as if they were 
providing a potential investor with financial advice. 
This philosophy is used to justify a greater scope for government regulation and 
involvement, and is manipulated in the governance of industry superannuation funds by the 
application of the Fair Work Act to superannuation contributions. Presently, the superannuation 
sector is largely outsourced to the private sector, placing enormous economic power in the hands of 
the trustees.  
                                                 




Without policy clarity in respect of the objectives of superannuation funds identified by 
Murray,175 it is but a short step to their application for economic development objectives, especially 
in a constrained fiscal environment. By 2035, the Australian superannuation sector is expected to 
have AUD6.1 trillion under management,176 of which approximately 50% would be in default 
funds. These economic development objectives may include infrastructure investment, venture 
capital, government securities, and other sectors which are adept at influencing the political milieu. 
There are already examples in the industry superannuation fund sector, and including where there 
are related parties. ‘“Investment strategy” is not anywhere defined in the SIS Act … there is little 
guidance provided as to what constitutes an investment strategy nor of the level of detail 
required’.177 Peer pressure, whether it be from similar funds, government policy objectives, or 
community views, can easily lead to trustee diversion ‘from their single minded pursuit of 
members’ interests by the clamour…’178 What may constitute best interest in the pursuit of peer 
performance in other jurisdictions cannot necessarily be translated to Australia. 
It is a short step to part nationalisation of some of these funds, particularly default funds, 
with the management subsumed into government agencies,179 already publicly suggested. This may 
suit the proponents of libertarian paternalism, and there are obvious arguments to support such a 
strategy.180 ‘A public sector solution is likely to be most efficient, provided the annuitisation is 
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compulsory’.181 Such a policy would do little to meet the Wallis objectives of investor 
empowerment.  
Murray182 supports the present regulatory architecture. Murray expresses concern about 
political intervention and makes the point that governments have an obligation to act in the long 
term national interest rather than using the financial system for short-term political gain. Policy 
stability and lack of clarity as to objectives are key findings in Murray since they can lead to 
political influences and the corruption of the system. Murray has sounded the warning bell. The 
Murray approach is for tactical incremental reform provided these basic strategic issues have been 
addressed. Whilst he ‘highlights [Australia’s] reliance on imported capital … and that unfair 
consumer outcomes remain prevalent’,183 there was no analysis of the underlying causes. These 
include the incidence of malfeasance arising from injudicious incentives based on prioritisation 
rather than prohibition, often with related parties.  
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8.  Culture and ‘Taint’ 
Heydon184 explored the interface between the financial system and registered organisations. He 
identifies different standards for their directors and officers. Malfeasance in registered organisations 
is of importance to the financial system given their influence over it directly and through ASX 
shareholdings held by their managed funds. Australia is known around the world as having the 
fourth largest pool of superannuation savings, and given their projected growth, identifying and 
removing systemic deficiencies is of national importance. Heydon185 is insightful and provides 
plentiful evidence to support the hypothesis of systemic and cyclical malfeasance. It also identifies 
two of the primary causes: deficiencies in regulation aided by an ‘unhealthy culture’. 
Statutory intervention into rectifying deficiencies in culture is not restricted to registered 
organisations. ‘Poor cultures, unsustainable business models, conflicted [financial product] 
distribution, and conflicts of interest’186 are sought to be eliminated by extending criminal sanctions 
to directors and officers. The thesis that poor culture drives poor conduct is of itself an admission 
that lack of effective enforcement of fiduciary obligations requires criminal remedies similar to 
those that presently exist in the Criminal Code.187 Whilst not deviating from its ex post posture to 
the extent of SIS Act supervision ― ‘we, as the regulator, won’t be looking over everyone’s 
shoulder to test their culture. We won’t dictate how a business is run’,188 nonetheless significantly 
extends the responsibilities of directors and officers. Specifically, further extension of director’s 
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civil and criminal liability to financial services and products regulation in the Corporations Act.189 
Extension of liability to subjective, ill-defined criteria would further add to uncertainty, with an 
additional best interest duty to customers, and further accessorial liability for market outcomes 
risks. It contradicts previous reform,190 and legal compliance with subjective opinion would be 
problematic.191 It is further evidence of statutory intervention into fiduciary principles without 
elimination of the reasons for this intervention. A necessary policy objective, but consistently 
wrong solution. 
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9. To… the Real Hayne ― the End of the Beginning 
Publicly reported disappointment with Hayne’s 76 Recommendations192 misses the point. His 
essential points are simplification of the law, reform of Australian approaches to conflicts of interest 
and duty, effectiveness of regulators, and improvements in leadership, governance and culture to 
meet community expectations of the behaviour of market participants. All of these are worthy 
objectives, not achieved by the specific recommendations alone. 
Hayne’s strategic reform is not explicit in a recommendation ― it occurs in the text.193 This 
is the need to simplify the law and implement its intent. He notes: ‘because the law is now spread 
over so many different Acts and is as complex as it is … the very size of the task shows why it must 
be tackled’.194 Further, ‘lobbying … has been a significant contributor to the current state of the 
law’.195 Hayne and Heydon both point to the need to eliminate lobbyist induced politically inspired 
carve-outs from the law, Heydon specifically referring to Workers Entitlement Funds, being 
exempted MIS. 
Hayne concludes: ‘the overall task is … much wider. It will require examination of how the 
existing laws fit together and identification of the various policies given effect by the law’s various 
provisions. Only once this detailed work is done can decisions be made about how those policies 
can be given better and simpler legislative effect’.196 Importantly: ‘the recommendations I have 
made cannot wait for that larger task to begin, let alone end’.197 Much of that framework has been 
done.198 Hayne wants an ‘integrated solution’ linking law and morality, noting that ‘Regulatory 
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gaming occurs when gaps open, an inevitable consequence of piecemeal change’. This is Hayne’s 
real message.  
What we presently have due to time and constraints implicit in the Letters Patent is more 
piecemeal tactical change, pleasing few, and without rectification of the underlying systemic 
causes. Management, not excision or cure. Many of Hayne’s recommendations are tactical and 
should be seen as a pathway to further widespread reform of the law. Specifically, with the 
exception of superannuation corporate trustees (but not their directors) he does not address the 
systemic problem of conflicts of interest and duty arising from related party transactions and other 
forms of value shifting. This has disappointed those opposed to ‘vertical integration’ business 
models. Reform of corporate trustee duty does however, open the way to dismantling of some 
conflicted business models. Similarly, he opens the way for repeal of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions 
in financial advice.199 Repeal would harmonise Australian law with comparable jurisdictions. He 
does not propose individual licensing, a necessary precondition for a status based fiduciary, and one 
of the reasons for the advent of so-called ‘dealer groups’. This is an omission in quality assuring the 
investment chain. 
If the predictive veracity of this author’s empirical analysis is correct,200 then the media 
reporting of egregious behaviour uncovered by Hayne, Heydon and the Productivity Commission 
should give great cause for concern. Reporting indicates that there is substantial contingent risk in 
superannuation and non-superannuation NBFEs.201 These cyclical manifestations have deep 
systemic causes. 
As Hayne notes, 
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given the existing breadth and complexity of the regulation of the financial services industry, 
adding any new layer of law or regulation will add a new layer of compliance cost and 
complexity. […] [T]here is every chance that adding a new layer of law and regulation would 
only serve to distract attention from the very simple ideas that must inform the conduct of 
financial services entities.202 [...] These ideas are very simple. Their simplicity points firmly 
towards a need to simplify the existing law [...] in the blizzard of [statutory] provisions, it is too 
easy to lose sight of those simple ideas that must inform the conduct of financial services 
entities.203 
The calls for this Royal Commission stemmed from 2014.204 Much of the case study material was 
old news.205 Its mandate should be extended to all NBFEs. Hayne distinguishes between ‘ticking 
boxes’ and ‘[w]hat is the right thing to do?’206 The ‘right thing’ meets community expectations of 
fiduciary obligation in the investment chain. 
The Productivity Commission largely supports Hayne, covering some familiar ground. It is 
mandated to improve competition in financial services and products provision as a disciplinary 
policy tool to improve consumer outcomes, acknowledging the need to balance financial stability 
and competition. It also recognises the practical limits of disclosure regulation, limited financial 
literacy competencies, recognising that behavioural economics provides important insights into 
policy formulation.207 These practical limitations are exacerbated by conflicts of interest, 
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particularly in vertically integrated businesses, proposing a ‘legal duty of care’.208 Canadian and 
German models thus become both relevant and insightful. 
That proposed duty includes design of a 21st century disclosure regime209 where ‘consumers 
resort to making decisions based on trust’.210 For the Productivity Commission to achieve this 
policy objective, fiduciary obligation to quality assure the investment chain is an essential and 
inviolable precondition. 
This is consistent with the need for a competition advocate. Competition should be seen as 
part of the overall thematic reform program, not separate from it. ‘For ASIC to act as a champion of 
financial system competition would require a clear change … and a change in its regulatory 
culture’.211 Until Hayne, there has been no ‘framework or a process for effective external review of 
the performance of its [Australian government] financial regulators’.212 This was also proposed by 
Murray,213 who recommended updating the Statements of Expectations of ASIC and APRA. 
Mandate extension without necessary reform is another Australian example of the ‘poacher 
being the gamekeeper’. The ASIC Capability Review also identified deficiencies in its strategic 
abilities. These extend ‘towards advancing consumer’s interest in financial products … That it has 
not already done so is of concern’.214 On Hayne’s recommendation,215 a Capability Review of 
APRA only commenced in 2019. 
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It is unfortunate that the Productivity Commission analysis of best interest obligations of 
financial advisers under the FoFA regime is incomplete.216 An uninformed reader might assume this 
is a statement of the law, which would be incorrect. Similarly, whilst a useful analysis of investor 
typology, there are no clear proposals for reform.217 It is equally unfortunate to propose extending 
ASIC’s mandate without an agreed plan to reform it. For ASIC to adopt a supervisory proactive 
posture will require its substantive reform. The Commission merely proposes further 
examination.218 Neither does it address some systemic deficiencies in Australia law, particularly the 
role of fiduciary law and the modernisation of trust law to accommodate the need for trustees to 
apply portfolio theory in their investment decisions.
10.  W[h]ither Australia? 
Four Themes in Law Reform 
Australian public policy is at a cross-roads. 2019 marks a seminal point in the financial reform 
period which commenced in 1981. There is a considerable risk that the egregious behaviour 
examined in the Hayne Royal Commission will result in more statutory intervention, a less 
entrepreneurial economy, higher costs and reduced availability of capital, and fewer market 
participants. Perhaps not a return to oligopoly, but nonetheless more restrictive and less 
internationally competitive. Conversely, the Productivity Commission proposes to extend ASIC’s 
mandate to competition.219 Whilst acknowledging the need for substantive ASIC reform,220 it 
proposes to repeat the error identified by Ashby in 2009 following UK regulator reform in 2007: 
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‘our regulators have been part of the problem’.221 
Australia presently is an international outlier in its financial regulation, its desire to become 
a world financial centre compromised. Fiduciary qualities are implicit in community expectations of 
trust and loyalty on whom they rely: these qualities need to be the basis of post-Hayne reform. 
Otherwise, egregious conduct will continue. Australia, as part of the Hayne inspired reform 
challenge needs to revisit the role of fiduciary law. In the Anglosphere, Canada has implemented 
reform in its regulation of financial services and products on fiduciary principles. German civil law 
(now incorporated into EU statutes) provides deep and relevant insight into consumer financial 
protection. 
If Australian directors and financial intermediaries were subject to similar provisions 
applying in Canada and Germany, they would be less able to hide behind box-ticking compliance 
processes. They would apply the spirit, principle and intent of the law for the benefit of their 
consumers. 
Much is made in the media and in political circles of the adjective “fiduciary” and the 
aphorism “best interest”. Australian statutes presently have seven interpretations of ‘best interest’ 
in different contexts, all different. The proposed addition of mortgage broker best interest duty 
make it eight, plus varying interpretations in the general law. There is limited public consideration 
of what these terms mean in practice, or whether the superlative ‘best’ has any real legal 
meaning.222 Fiduciary law has largely been subsumed by statute to the role of ‘legal polyfilla’. For 
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instance, in many respects financial advice consumers are worse off now than before the FoFA 
reforms. This is largely the result of lobbying. 
Whilst Australia has benefited from its Twin Peaks (now Triple Peaks) market based 
regulatory architecture, its regulation of financial products and financial services requires 
substantive strategic reform supported by tactical interventions. This includes law reform and 
reforms designed to enhance productivity in the economy. Without substantive reform, there will 
not be adequate remedy of the systemic deficiencies in regulation nor of their cyclical 
manifestations which harm productivity. Present responses to public anger are mainly tactical in 
nature. That anger is based upon flawed community expectations and a belated understanding that 
what market participants do can be different from what those participants are expected to do. There 
is not, in Australia, sufficient understanding by the investing public of competing policy approaches 
or the benefits that the market based approach has brought to the community. Hardship driven 
policy change could destroy the economic benefits of an entrepreneurial society. 
The four reform themes are: Re-establishment of trust in the investment chain based on 
fiduciary obligation; Related party transactions, value shifting through tunnelling and conflicts of 
interest; Architecture for implementation at the financial consumer level ― financial planning and 
wealth management as a profession; and Market conduct regulation for the 21st century (including 
ASIC reform). To improve Australia’s position as a world financial centre, these reform themes are 
to be given tactical support in disclosure, NBFE corporate governance, MIS, and director and 
trustees competencies. These four law reform themes, will need to be implemented by four teams 
reporting to a senior ministerial level special purpose financial consumer-centric Reference Group. 
Reform requires significant elapsed time, probably a decade, and it must be sequenced. 
Strategic reform requires acceptance and implementation by the various stakeholder groups. 
Tactical reforms can be imposed legislatively. The effectiveness and stability generated by 
prudential supervision needs to be embedded as a governance value system ― a culture ― within 
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the non-prudentially regulated NBFE sector. Successful implementation aligns interest of provider 
and consumer: it also changes the role of the regulators: they become educators, supervisors. A 
healthy culture results in enforcement becoming a last resort. ‘The answer to cultural shortcomings 
is developing high standards of professionalism and excellence’.223  
The former Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) provides an administrative 
precedent for a series of strategic and tactical reforms which better implement Australia’s market 
based regulatory system and enhance its national productivity. Rather than change the regulatory 
architecture, reform should be directed at much better implementation of that architecture to 
eliminate its systemic deficiencies and cyclical manifestations. However, this is not as simple as 
some suggest.224 Australia requires more than incremental change to a failing system. That reflects 
the magnitude of the task ahead, strategic in scope and objective, each theme supported by tactical 
statutory interventions. 
The benefits of efficiently designed and implemented reform include increased capital 
availability for Australian industry, less systemic risk for investors, increased financial literacy and 
knowledge for investors, and harmonisation of Australian financial regulation with international 
norms. The latter opens the way for financial product portability internationally and more 
investment options for Australian investors. These reforms open the way for a true private banking 
industry in Australia. They provide the basis for veracity in public policy uncorrupted by sectional 
and political influence. 
2019 is the end of the beginning of modern Australian financial reform. Choice of road is at 
hand. Parliament must decide. It must be presented with alternative options. One option stems from 
the Hayne Royal Commission. This paper presents another option: it proposes the ‘Age of Statutes’ 
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evolve to the ‘Age of Trust’, firmly rooted in the fertile soil of Donalds’ ‘nobler qualities’225 of 
fiduciaries. Those fiduciary qualities are implicit in community expectation of trust and loyalty on 
whom they rely. Those expectations demand that the basis of a modern regulatory regime be based 
on the four reform themes.  
What does Australia wish to achieve as a modern nation? Does it wish to develop its modern 
story as an entrepreneurial economy competing with its global peers? Does it remain largely reliant 
on resources extraction and low value employment? Does it want to leverage off innovation and 
skills? Does it want to develop its SME sector? The answers to these questions determine future 
public policy in financial services and products regulation. Egregious conduct is contagious. It 
becomes part of the culture. Does Australia continue its tradition of statutory accretion which has 
allowed it to flourish? Or do these insights provide a framework? This the cross-road that 
Parliament must now traverse. It is a binary choice. 
If the former road, then this paper predicts that the future will be similar to the recent past. If 
not, then Australia must undertake reform of financial regulation. Entrepreneurial freedoms must be 
matched by participant acceptance of fiduciary obligation to guide and enforce market conduct 
standards: the two are symbiotic. This is evolutionary, some may say revolutionary. It is not 
revolutionary: it returns Australian financial regulation to a positive culture of trust, honesty and 
fair dealing.226 That is a culture that provides for entrepreneurship, business growth and future 
employment. 
The Law Matters: Australia: 
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needs a system that evades the risk aversion that has become common practice and returns to 
our roots as an entrepreneurial community breaking new barriers. In the 21st century regulation 
needs to avoid paternalism without completely abandoning prudent protection of interest.227 
It is not merely a matter of law, something missed by those who prescribe statutory remedy for 
every ill. That is the easier route: the quick fix, the instant medication. Evolution is rarely 
accidental: it is a response to environmental change and the opportunities afforded by new niches. 
This is the more thoughtful route, taking time to effect cultural change. 
Implementation of the four reform themes will require national leadership: from Parliament 
given form by the Executive. Stakeholder support is essential. A senior Parliamentary ministerial 
champion supported by the special purpose Reference Group with Commonwealth financial support 
is required. It could be based on the inoperative but extant Financial Sector Advisory Council. 
Implementation should be considered as a decade long policy objective working in tandem with the 
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR). The CFR should have an enhanced mandate to supervise 
implementation within its regulator stakeholder group. Within each theme, specific tactical 
legislative interventions in disclosure, national productivity strategy, and governance are needed. 
These four themes will require considerable statutory support, for consistency guided by the 
Reference Group and the responsible minister. The Reference Group should sponsor and supervise 
an independent arbiter to reduce dependence on the court system. The CFR will consider and 
publicly explain in a comprehensive transparent way what the impact of the reform themes are. It is: 
                                                 





a vehicle for improving regulators’ ability to influence expectation in financial markets. It can 
build trust in the actions of regulators. But of greatest value is its capacity to be a forum that can 
test the proposition of a macroprudential intervention….228 
Some stakeholders will be challenged: others, qualitative research identifies, will be supportive. All 
stakeholders must focus on the needs of investors and beneficiaries in the investment chain, not 
their own sectoral interests. There must be commonality of objective disciplined by a financially 
empowered literate community led by champions.  
2019 must be the start of the ‘Age of Trust’. Is Australia up to the challenge? 
 
                                                 
228 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System (Draft 
Report, January 2018) 476. This refers specifically to a competition advocate but can be applied more 
broadly to each of the reform themes and their tactical manifestations. 
